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Abstract We provide evidence that religious skeptics, as
compared to believers, are both more reflective and effective
in logical reasoning tasks. While recent studies have reported
a negative association between an analytic cognitive style and
religiosity, they focused exclusively on accuracy, making it
difficult to specify potential underlying cognitive mecha-
nisms. The present study extends the previous research by
assessing both performance and response times on quintes-
sential logical reasoning problems (syllogisms). Those report-
ing more religious skepticism made fewer reasoning errors
than did believers. This finding remained significant after
controlling for general cognitive ability, time spent on the
problems, and various demographic variables. Crucial for
the purpose of exploring underlying mechanisms, response
times indicated that skeptics also spent more time reasoning
than did believers. This novel finding suggests a possible role
of response slowing during analytic problem solving as a
component of cognitive style that promotes overriding intui-
tive first impressions. Implications for using additional pro-
cessing measures, such as response time, to investigate
individual differences in cognitive style are discussed.
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A fundamental postulate of dual-process theories is that hu-
man thinking is influenced by two fundamentally different
types of processing: (1) fast and frugal “intuitive” processes,
and (2) slow and deliberative “analytic” processes. The inter-
action between intuitive and analytic processes has been used
to explain a consistent body of findings over decades of
reasoning and decision-making research (for reviews, see
Baron, 1994; Shafir & Tverksy, 1995; Stanovich & West,
2000).
Recent evidence has suggested that dual-process theory
can also be used to predict degrees of supernatural belief
(Cheyne & Pennycook, 2013; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012;
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012;
Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). Specifically, those who
are less likely to engage in analytic processing during problem
solving, as indexed by the accuracy of their solutions, are
more likely to hold a variety of religious beliefs (e.g., in the
existence of God, heaven, hell, miracles, the soul, angels, and
demons). Here we extend this prior work by using an arguably
more direct measure of cognitive processing than has been
used previously (response time), coupled with a performance
measure (accuracy), to better understand the potential mech-
anisms that underlie the observed negative relation between
analytic thinking and religious beliefs.
Belief bias and dual-process theory
The syllogism, a paradigm of logical processing, is perhaps
the most widely studied example of analytic reasoning.
Participants are provided with two premises and a conclu-
sion, instructed to assume that the information in the prem-
ises is true and asked to judge the validity of the conclusion
(i.e., whether it follows logically from the premises).
Consider the following example:
All mammals can walk.
Whales are mammals.
Therefore, whales can walk.
The logical structure of the syllogism is valid (i.e., the
conclusion follows logically from the premises). The con-
clusion, however, is unbelievable. Decades of research has
reported that people often incorrectly respond on the basis of
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believability rather than validity (Markovits & Nantel, 1989;
Oakhill, Johnson-Laird, & Garnham, 1989; Sá, West, &
Stanovich, 1999). Within a dual-process framework (e.g.,
Evans, 2008; Evans & Frankish, 2009; Stanovich, 2009),
belief biases are thought to occur due to an overreliance on
fast, intuitive “Type 1” processes that rapidly evaluate be-
lievability and a failure to sufficiently engage the slow,
deliberative, analytic “Type 2” processes involved in apply-
ing the rules of logic. Indeed, belief bias is often used as the
canonical exemplar of the interplay between intuitive and
analytic processing (e.g., De Neys, 2006b; Evans, 2008).
Cognitive style, cognitive ability, and religiosity
Dual-process theorists sometimes differentiate between cog-
nitive ability and cognitive style (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich
&West, 1998, 2000, 2008; Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2011);
cognitive ability refers to a capacity for analytic processing,
whereas cognitive style refers to a tendency or willingness to
engage in analytic processing (Stanovich, 2009). Stanovich
and colleagues have provided evidence that both cognitive
style and ability are determinants of reasoning performance.
With respect to syllogisms, for example, participants who are
more willing to engage in Type 2 processing perform better
(i.e., are more likely to reason according to logic), regardless
of cognitive ability (Stanovich & West, 1998, 2000).
The distinction between cognitive ability and cognitive
style may have important implications for psychological
factors outside of those traditionally discussed in the context
of reasoning experiments. Consistent with this idea, three
recent studies have independently found that people who
were more willing to engage in analytic thought reported
having weaker religious and paranormal beliefs, even after
controlling for cognitive ability (Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2012).
These studies form part of a growing literature that links
more analytic, open-minded, or “rational” reasoning with
nonbelief in supernatural phenomena. Stanovich and col-
leagues, for example, foreshadowed this more recent work
in previous studies by including a paranormal belief scale
(Stanovich & West, 1998) and a superstitious-thinking scale
(Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007) in a composite self-
reported analytic-versus-intuitive thinking disposition scale,
which in turn was correlated with reasoning performance on
a wide variety of tasks (including syllogisms). More direct-
ly, work by Aarnio, Lindeman, and colleagues has involved
using self-report thinking disposition measures to support
the claim that believers in the paranormal have less reflec-
tive and more intuitive thinking dispositions (Aarnio &
Lindeman, 2005, 2007; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006, 2007;
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2012). More generally, within the
domain of religious belief, atheists have been found to be
more intellectual, rational, and skeptical relative to theists
(e.g., Beit-Hallahmi, 2007). It should be noted, however,
that the more recent work by Gervais and Norenzayan,
Pennycook et al., and Shenhav et al. is distinct from these
past studies in three important ways: (1) Performance-based
measures of reasoning style, as opposed to self-report, were
used to predict supernatural belief directly; (2) numerous
control variables, including cognitive ability, were included
to rule out possible third-variable interpretations
(Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2012); and (3)
experimental manipulations were used to verify a causal
path between analytic thinking and religious belief
(Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Shenhav et al., 2012).
However, these recent studies are far from definitive.
Specifically, in measuring cognitive style, both Gervais
and Norenzayan (2012) and Shenhav et al. (2012) relied
on a single type of reasoning problem, the Cognitive
Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005), and Pennycook et
al. (2012) employed just two tasks, the CRT and base-rate
problems. As both CRT and base-rate problems involve
mathematical or probabilistic reasoning, it is necessary to
test the generalizability of the postulated relation between
cognitive style and religious belief in other, nonmathemati-
cal domains of reasoning.
Perhaps more importantly, the previous work has also
focused exclusively on reasoning performance (i.e., accura-
cy). Dual-process theorists have been criticized for overreli-
ance on response output as opposed to measures intended to
more directly assess cognitive processing (e.g., Gigerenzer &
Regier, 1996). The primary criticism is that differences in
accuracy can be explained by factors outside of cognitive
style. While this issue has been partially addressed by mea-
suring and controlling for cognitive ability (e.g., Pennycook et
al., 2012), other factors could contribute to observed differ-
ences in accuracy. For example, some participants may have a
“mindware gap,” such that they lack the necessary knowledge
to successfully solve the problem (i.e., even if they do engage
in Type 2 processing; Stanovich, 2009). Mindware gaps are
individual differences in domain-specific skills that are sepa-
rate from general factors such as intelligence and working
memory capacity (Stanovich, 2009). Alternatively, people
who do well on logic–belief conflict tasks may simply be
more generally reflective in their approach to problems, taking
more time to assess alternative responses. In the present work,
we therefore assessed response times (RTs) as a first step
toward more directly probing differences in underlying pro-
cesses during reasoning and associating these with both ana-
lytic performance and religious belief status. While RT is also
presumably influenced bymany factors, a selective increase in
RTwhile reasoning has been taken as a sign of the use of Type
2 processes, because slower responding is generally expected
under higher levels of deliberation (e.g., De Neys, 2006a;
Evans, 2008). Thus, measuring RT allows us to shed light
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on a possible cognitive mechanism underlying the negative
relation between analytic thinking and religious belief: re-
sponse slowing.
Predictions
The four different types of syllogisms combine the variables
validity and believability: valid–believable (VB), valid–unbe-
lievable (VU), invalid–believable (IB), and invalid–unbeliev-
able (IU). Belief bias effects occur when there is a decrease in
accuracy for conflict problems (IB and VU) relative to non-
conflict (VB and IU) (see Klauer, Musch, & Naumer, 2000, for
a review). As performance for conflict problems has been
shown to be related to cognitive style (e.g., Stanovich &
West, 1998), we predicted that accuracy for conflict problems
(i.e., avoiding belief bias) would be negatively correlated with
religious belief, even when controlling for cognitive ability. For
the same reasons, we also predicted that performance on non-
conflict problems would not be related to cognitive style,
ability, or (by extension) religious belief, as the intuitive
belief-based response would be consistent with logical consid-
erations (Stanovich & West, 2000). Furthermore, under the
hypothesis that Type 2 processing is slower than Type 1 pro-
cessing, participants who engage in more Type 2 processing
should spend more time reasoning. Although some recent
studies have used RT analyses to investigate the processes that
underlie deductive reasoning (e.g., DeNeys, 2006a; DeNeys&
Glumicic, 2008; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Thompson,
Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011), none have used RT to
assess individual differences in cognitive style. We predicted
that those with faster RTs would have decreased accuracy on
syllogisms and be more likely to hold specific religious beliefs.
Method
Participants
A group of 91 University ofWaterloo psychology undergraduate
students (66 female, 25 male; average age = 19.5 years) partic-
ipated in a session lasting approximately 30 min. Participation
was voluntary, and participants received course credit.
Measures
All measures were presented on a computer monitor
using E-Prime version 1.2. RT was measured from the
onset of problem presentation, and therefore included
reading time.
Syllogistic reasoning task Eight syllogisms were taken from
the work of Markovitz and Nantel (1989), and participants
were asked to decide whether the conclusions followed
logically from their premises. Participants selected “yes”
or “no” by pressing a button on the keyboard. The partic-
ipants were given standard instructions explaining the con-
cept of logical validity and emphasizing that they should
select “yes” if and only if the conclusion logically followed
from the premises. Four of the problems had conclusions
that did follow logically from the premises (i.e., were valid),
and four did not; in addition, four had believable conclu-
sions and four had unbelievable conclusions, yielding four
different problem types that were each presented twice.
Belief rating task Following the syllogisms, participants
were asked to rate the believability of each of the conclusion
statements from each of the eight syllogisms. Rating the
believability of an obviously true or false statement likely
does not require much more than cursory analytic process-
ing. Thus, the RT for the belief rating task was taken as a
proxy measure of individual differences in reading time,
which was then treated as a control variable.
WordSum WordSum, used here as a control for cognitive
ability, is a brief vocabulary test that correlates well with
full-scale measures of intelligence (e.g., r = .40 with the full-
scale WAIS-R, .60 after a correction for attenuation; Huang
& Hauser, 1998). Participants were presented with ten target
words in capital letters and asked to choose the one of the
provided options that most closely matching the meaning of
the target word.
Religiosity The Religious Belief (Rb) scale assesses five
conventional religious beliefs held in varying degrees by
religious people: heaven, hell, miracles, afterlife, and the
existence of angels and demons. Each of the items was
converted to a POMP score (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, &
West, 1999), and a sum was then calculated across items.
Higher scores reflected higher belief. The scale had good
distributional properties and acceptable internal consistency,
Cronbach’s alpha = .91.
Demographics Participants completed a demographics
questionnaire at the beginning of the semester as part
of a participant pool prescreen. From this, we obtained
information on socioeconomic status (SES), ethnicity,
year in university, and university faculty to act as addi-
tional control variables (none of which had been exam-
ined as potential mediators in previous research). For
SES, participants indicated, on a scale from 1 to 8,
which social class they most strongly identified with
(1 = working class, 8 = upper class). As the majority of
participants listed their ethnicity as either White/Caucasian
(47.3 %) or Asian (31.9 %), the remaining ethnic groups were
coded as “other.”
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Results
Correlations among the major variables are presented in
Table 1. Descriptive statistics can be found in the supple-
mentary materials. As expected, religious belief was strong-
ly negatively correlated with accuracy for conflict
syllogisms but not nonconflict syllogisms, and the differ-
ence between the two correlations was significant by a
Williams test, t(85) = 2.73, p = .008.1 Religious belief was
also negatively correlated with overall mean RTs for both
syllogisms and WordSum, indicating that skeptics also spent
more time on both tasks. Furthermore, overall RT for syllo-
gisms was positively correlated with accuracy for conflict
syllogisms, consistent with the hypothesis that increased
reasoning time reflects increased Type 2 processing (De
Neys, 2006a; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Finally, belief
rating RT was positively correlated with RTs for syllogisms
and WordSum, as would be expected given stable differ-
ences in response tempo across the tasks. Importantly, how-
ever, the RT for the belief rating task did not correlate with
religious belief, and the correlation between religious belief
and syllogism RT remained robust when controlling for
belief rating RT (rp = −.23, p = .028) or WordSum RT
(rp = −.22, p = .035). Hence, it appears that the correlations
between religious belief and RTs for cognitive measures are
unlikely to have arisen due to differences in reading time or
nonspecific individual differences in response tempo.
WordSum performance was also correlated significantly
negatively with religious belief and positively with perfor-
mance for conflict problems. Thus, to assess the indepen-
dent relation between analytic cognitive style and religious
belief, a regression analysis was conducted predicting reli-
gious belief from syllogism performance (i.e., accuracy for
conflict syllogisms), controlling for demographic variables,
RT for the belief-rating task, mean RT for WordSum and
syllogisms (“WS/Syll RT”),2 and WordSum performance
(see the supplementary materials for the full regression).3
As is clear from Table 2, syllogism performance continued
to make a significant independent contribution to the pre-
diction of Rb. Participants with a more analytic cognitive
style, as indexed by performance on conflict syllogisms
while controlling for cognitive ability, were less likely to
endorse religious beliefs, independent of sex, socioeconom-
ic status, ethnicity, year in university, university faculty,
reading ability, and time spent on reasoning tasks. RTs for
syllogisms and WordSum also remained significant in the
final step of the regression, providing further support for the
proposed relation between religious belief and RT.
Discussion
The present work extends recent research by demonstrating
a negative relation between analytic thinking and religious
belief (Cheyne & Pennycook, 2013; Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2012).
Specifically, those better able to overcome belief bias during
deductive reasoning tended also to be religiously skeptical.4
In addition, the RTs on syllogisms suggest that more skep-
tical participants also spent more time than did religious
participants when reasoning on challenging tasks. Both ac-
curacy and RT also predicted religious belief independently
of one another and of several variables potentially offering
alternative explanations. This work, together with that by
Pennycook et al. and Shenhav et al., has thus far ruled out
sex, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, income, year in univer-
sity, university faculty, education (in a nonuniversity sam-
ple), political ideology, age, religious engagement, various
personality variables (see Shenhav et al., 2012), and cogni-
tive ability (using multiple measures) as potential mediators
of the negative relation between reasoning performance and
religious belief. Together, these data suggest (a) that people
who are less religious are more willing to engage in analytic
“Type 2” reasoning, and, preliminarily, (b) that one of the
potential cognitive mechanisms that underlies this relation is
response slowing.
While much research in reasoning has employed RT as a
measure of Type 2 engagement (e.g., De Neys, 2006a; De
Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Thompson et al., 2011), the use of
RT to assess individual differences in reasoning is, to our
knowledge, novel. Using RT as a complementary measure to
reasoning performance strikes us as an interesting strategy to
more directly investigate differences in cognitive style. As
numerous factors will surely influence RT, such as general
processing speed or reading ability, differences in cognitive
style would likely need to be fairly substantial to be indexed
by differences in RT. Of course, given the highly variable
nature of RT, it is also important to have strong a priori reasons
to assume that increases in RT reflect actual differences in
analytic processing. Here, for example, we asked participants
to assess logical validity, a task that surely elicits some degree
of analytic reasoning. This presumption was validated by the1 The results are highly similar when problems are broken up into four
categories (i.e., Rb correlates with accuracy for VU and IB syllogisms
but not for VB and IU syllogisms).
2 RTs for syllogisms and WordSum were combined in the regression on
account of their high intercorrelation and near identical correlations
with religious belief.
3 Three participants were excluded from the analysis due to missing
demographic information.
4 As a standard caveat, it should be noted that we are not making a
value judgment about whether it is “better” to have an analytic or
intuitive cognitive style. While the propensity for analytic thought
happens to lead to better performance on syllogisms, in many situa-
tions heuristic thinking is beneficial (see Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC
Research Group, 1999).
Psychon Bull Rev
finding that those who took longer on the syllogismswere also
less prone to belief bias. Thus, we suggest that at least part of
the variation in RTs for syllogisms was a result of differences
in the willingness to engage analytic reasoning, and therefore,
the negative correlation between religious belief and syllo-
gism RT provides further evidence for the hypothesized neg-
ative relation between analyticity and religiosity.
The negative correlation between syllogism RT and reli-
gious belief is an intriguing, but preliminary, piece of evidence
for the possible role of “response slowing” as a component of
analytic cognitive style that promotes overriding intuitive “first
impressions.” It is noteworthy, however, that this extra process-
ing time was insufficient to fully explain the analytic perfor-
mance association with religious belief. This suggests that
religious skeptics are perhaps both more reflective and more
effective during reasoning. Skeptics, in other words, appear to
be both more analytical in their disposition and better able to
perform the mental operations necessary to correctly solve
logic problems. This makes sense because having an analytic
disposition would likely have an attenuated effect on religious
belief if the ability to successfully represent and manipulate
representations via Type 2 processing were lacking.
An unexpected result was the finding that RT on the
WordSum vocabulary test was also negatively correlated
with religious belief. While one could argue that the
WordSum task also potentially requires some level of ana-
lytic processing that could be affected by individual differ-
ences, this result should be treated with caution.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the WS task does
involve considering and selecting from a set of options,
and the mean RT for the WordSum items was only 1 s less
than that for syllogisms (see the supplementary materials). It
is possible that some of the presented options may have
“felt” right, and hence required some reflective capacity to
hold off decision pending consideration of other options—a
characteristic of analytic tasks, such as the Cognitive
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005), that have previously been
associated with religious beliefs (Gervais & Norenzayan,
2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2012).
Alternatively, it may be that response slowing may happen
chronically among those with an analytic cognitive style as
a strategy to insulate reasoning from intuitive outputs, re-
gardless of whether the influence of intuitive outputs is
actually detected. Of course, it is also entirely possible that
neither of these explanations is accurate, because individual
differences in some other variable, such as reading ability,
underlie the apparent relation between RT and religious
belief. We note, however, that religiosity did not correlate
Table 1 Pearson product–moment correlations among major variables
Performance RT
Conflict Nonconflict WS Syllogism WS Belief
Rating
Rb –.46 –.03 –.34 –.24 –.23 –.07
Conflict –.04 .30 .27 .01 .20
Nonconflict .19 –.10 –.10 –.03
WS .17 .16 .15
Syllogism RT .48 .50
WS RT .32
Rb religious beliefs; WS WordSum; Conflict accuracy for conflict
syllogisms, Nonconflict accuracy for nonconflict syllogisms. Coeffi-
cients in bold are significant at p < .05. N = 91
Table 2 Final step of hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting
religious beliefs with accuracy for conflict syllogisms (Conflict Acc.)
while controlling for sex, socioeconomic status (SES), ethnicity (Cauca-
sian, Asian), year in university, university faculty (1 = arts, 2 = science/
engineering/mathematics), belief rating response time (RT), mean RTs for
syllogisms and WordSum (WS/Syll RT), WordSum accuracy (WS Acc.),
and nonconflict syllogism accuracy (Nonconflict Acc.)
B SE Β t p r rp
Intercept 460.71 105.75 4.36 <.001
Sex 19.47 26.24 0.08 0.74 .460 .24 .09
SES −5.33 7.93 −0.07 −0.67 .503 –.16 –.08
Caucasian −12.24 29.12 −0.06 −0.42 .676 –.23 –.05
Asian 25.54 30.77 0.11 0.83 .409 .13 .10
Univ. Year −8.35 9.75 −0.08 −0.86 .395 –.12 –.10
Univ. Faculty −7.97 22.31 −0.04 −0.36 .722 .01 –.04
Belief Rating RT 0.02 <0.01 0.19 1.65 .103 –.07 .19
WS/Syll RT −0.01 <0.01 −0.26 −2.23 .029 –.26 –.25
WS Acc. −112.19 69.03 −0.17 −1.63 .108 –.33 –.18
Nonconflict Acc. −23.89 61.18 −0.04 −0.39 .697 –.05 –.05
Conflict Acc. −91.53 28.10 −0.34 −3.26 .002 –.44 –.35
N = 88.
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with RTs on the belief-rating task. Clearly, more research
will be necessary to elaborate the potentially complex rela-
tion between RT and cognitive style.
As this study is the first to use RT in this way, it is
important to treat our results with caution. Nonetheless, on
the basis of the foregoing discussion, we suggest that
increases in RT are generally reflective of increased Type 2
processing, given a task for which (a) analytic processing is
required and (b) variability in the relative engagement of
analytic processing during task performance is expected,
because of individual differences (as was the case here),
task-specific cues, such as response conflict (e.g., De Neys
& Glumicic, 2008), or metacognitive “feelings of rightness”
(Thompson et al., 2011). Taking this approach allowed us to
provide further evidence for the potential relation between
cognitive style and religious belief. We suggest, on this
basis, that using RT as a measure complementary to accu-
racy in order to index differences in the willingness to
engage analytic processing is an intriguing and potentially
fruitful direction for future research.
Author note Funding for this study was provided by the Natural
Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada.
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